Loss underreporting and the auditing role of bank exams by Jeffrey W. Gunther & Robert R. Moore
Loss Underreporting and the 
Auditing Role of Bank Exams
March 15, 2002 
Prepared for a symposium on 
The Impact of Economic Slowdowns on Financial Institutions and Their Regulators
sponsored jointly by the 
Federal Reserve Bank of Boston and the Journal of Financial Intermediation
April 17-19, 2002 
Jeffery W. Gunther and Robert R. Moore 
Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas 
Abstract.  Using a unique set of banking data containing both originally reported and subsequently 
revised financial variables, we study the incidence of adverse revisions to accounting statements.  As 
might be expected, our findings indicate banks are more likely to underreport financial losses when their 
financial performance is substandard.  In addition, we provide evidence that supervisory exams have an 
important role in uncovering financial problems and ensuring bank accounting statements reflect them.
Specifically, our estimations point to a significant auditing effect, through which exams can lead to a 
restatement of financial results to reflect a greater degree of financial difficulty than originally reported.
Interestingly, this auditing role of exams is evident not only for institutions previously identified as 
supervisory concerns, but also at highly rated banks, where financial problems are only just emerging.
Because a banking downturn would increase not only the number of problem institutions requiring
additional supervisory attention, but also the incidence of loss underreporting at highly rated banks, our 
findings stress the value of efforts to maintain or bolster the supervisory system’s capacity to expand 
exam activity quickly and substantially. 
Corresponding author: Jeffery W. Gunther, Financial Industry Studies Department, Federal Reserve 
Bank of Dallas, 2200 N. Pearl St., Dallas, TX 75201. 
E-mail: jeffery.w.gunther@dal.frb.org.
JEL classification codes: G21, L51, and C25. 
The views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the position of the Federal 
Reserve Bank of Dallas or the Federal Reserve System.  We would like to thank, without implicating,
two anonymous referees for their helpful comments and suggestions.1.  Introduction 
Without access to accurate information regarding the financial condition of individual 
banks, it would be difficult for regulatory and market discipline to circumscribe bank behavior 
effectively.  Regulatory devices, such as prompt corrective action, together with market-based
solutions to supervisory concerns, all depend on the ability of regulators and market participants 
to respond to changes in a bank’s financial condition.  However, there are good reasons to 
suspect a bank’s true condition may be more readily apparent to its managers than to outsiders, 
including regulators and investors.  As described by Townsend (1979), such an information
asymmetry can significantly affect the relationship between insiders and outsiders.
Efforts to bridge this information gap have a long history.  In the early 1800s, some states 
required banks to file reports of condition with the governor or legislature, arguing the state was 
a shareholder in the banks and therefore entitled to the information (Robertson 1995).  However, 
the reports contained only broad breakdowns of assets and liabilities and no information bank 
directors did not wish to disclose.  In 1869, Congress empowered the Comptroller of the 
Currency to “call” for a full statement of condition from national banks several times a year.
Supervisors since have made many changes to the resulting call report, but its purpose remains
the same—to provide timely information regarding banks’ financial condition. 
The modern call report, or Report of Condition and Income, is filed quarterly by all banks 
and contains hundreds of accounting items that supervisors and private analysts use to
characterize the financial condition of both individual banks and the banking sector.  Because 
call reports are filed quarterly, whereas banks are typically examined about once every twelve to 
eighteen months, call report data potentially provide a more up-to-date picture of a bank’s 
condition than supervisory exams alone.  For this reason, both supervisors and private-sector 
analysts use call report data extensively in a variety of efforts to monitor banks’ financial condition.  It seems reasonable to suspect that the effectiveness of these monitoring efforts 
depends to a large degree on the accuracy of the reported information.  If the call report data are 
subject to significant revisions, then the report’s usefulness in tracking financial developments in 
real time might be compromised, as conjectured by Cole and Gunther (1998).
In addition, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act’s prompt
corrective action mandates tie the supervisory treatment of a bank to its financial condition, as 
portrayed in the call report.  As a result, the degree to which a bank’s supervisory treatment is 
aligned with its financial condition depends critically on the accuracy of the call report data. 
How accurate, then, is the call report information?  To gain insight into this and related
issues, we analyze a unique set of data that includes the originally reported values of key 
financial variables, along with their values as reported at a later time, which reflect any revisions 
that occurred subsequent to the initial reports.  Not surprisingly, a study of these revisions 
indicates banks are more likely to originally underreport financial losses when their financial
performance is substandard.  In addition, we provide evidence that supervisory exams have an 
important role in uncovering financial problems and ensuring bank accounting statements reflect 
them.  Based on several different specifications, our results indicate exams often lead to a 
restatement of financial results to reflect a greater degree of financial difficulty than originally
reported.  In other words, exams effectively force bad news into the call report numbers.  More 
remarkably, this auditing role of exams is evident not only for institutions previously identified 
as supervisory concerns, but also at highly rated banks, where financial problems are only just 
emerging.
We would like to note at the outset that in many cases exam findings may simply be 
reflected in a bank’s current, or upcoming, call report, as opposed to revisions to previously 
reported figures.  As a result, call report revisions alone clearly would not be expected to reflect 
- 2 -the full extent of the auditing role of bank exams.  Moreover, we are not able in this study to 
identify the factors influencing whether exam findings are reflected in upcoming call reports or 
revisions to previous reports.  Nevertheless, the revisions provide a unique window through 
which to view the results of exam activity.  Because the revisions can be calculated as simple
differences between the original and revised reports, there is no need to estimate the impact of 
exam findings using deviations from expected, or normal, values.
We believe our empirical findings based on financial statement revisions have important
supervisory implications.  Our results indicate a banking downturn would likely work through 
two related channels to adversely impact the reliability of bank financial statements.  First, as 
financial conditions deteriorated, we would expect, based on our results, an increase in the 
incidence of loss underreporting. Second, as supervisors spent additional time at the increasing 
number of troubled institutions, fewer supervisory resources might be available for routine 
exams.  Because we find exams play an important role in uncovering financial misstatements,
even at highly rated institutions, the reduction in supervisory resources available for routine
exams could delay the correction of the rising number of underreported losses.  The resulting 
deterioration in the quality of financial data could then impede the operation of supervisory and 
market discipline. 
While today the banking sector appears to be holding up fairly well, there are signs of 
deterioration, implying the issues raised in our analysis may be relevant not only to future policy, 
but to the current situation as well.  In Figure 1, we show for all U.S. commercial banks the mean
value of the ratio of annual loan loss provisions to average assets.  The burden of asset quality 
problems on bank profitability is nowhere near its peak of the mid-1980s, but the upward trend 
in this indicator is somewhat disturbing.  The unique data used in our study are available only for 
the 1996-98 period, which as shown in Figure 1 was a relatively tranquil time for the banking 
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financial statements.  Given that financial conditions have deteriorated somewhat further since 
then, we expect that the auditing role of exams we document has become even more immediately
relevant.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.  The next section provides some
institutional background regarding the potential relationship between the results of supervisory 
exams and revisions to financial statements.  We then proceed to a description of the data we 
use, the presentation of our empirical results, and our conclusions. 
2. Background 
2.1.  Loan loss accounting 
Deterioration in loan portfolios typically has been the primary proximate cause of 
downturns in the banking sector.  At the center of the banking industry’s system to account for 
loan quality problems is the allowance for loan and lease losses (ALLL).  Through provision for 
loan and lease losses, banks add funds to ALLL.  These provisions are an expense item and 
reduce a bank’s net income.  The ALLL balance is subtracted from total loans, so loans on the 
balance sheet are reported net of ALLL.  When loans are charged off, total loans are reduced by 
the amount of the losses, but the losses are charged against ALLL, leaving net loans unaffected.
If a bank recovers some of the losses on loans previously charged off, the recoveries are added 
back to ALLL.
When a bank charges off a loan, the resulting loss does not affect reported net income,
since the charge-off is against ALLL.  Credit quality problems affect reported profitability when 
a bank incurs the provision expense, since the expense directly reduces net income.  As a result,
timely disclosure of information on credit quality and its impact on overall operating results 
depends on the degree to which provisions are made in anticipation of, or concurrent with, actual 
- 4 -impairment in the loan portfolio.  If adequate provisions are made only after the impairment
occurs, profitability prior to the provisions is overstated.
One factor that might prompt banks to set an insufficient level of ALLL and provision 
expense involves regulatory or market-based penalties for a deterioration in financial condition.
Risk-based capital requirements allow banks to count ALLL only in Tier 2 capital and only up to 
1.25 percent of risk-weighted assets.  By not making the necessary provisions, banks with asset-
quality problems can raise reported net income and retained earnings, thereby boosting Tier 1 
capital and potentially avoiding the restrictions supervisors typically place on troubled banks.
1
2.2.  Verifying the adequacy of ALLL
Given the current institutional framework, which assigns supervisors a large role in the 
monitoring and disciplining of banks, the incentive to underreport provisions provides a 
particularly strong reason for supervisory exams.  The Commercial Bank Examination Manual 
states that “the examiner’s responsibility to determine the adequacy of a bank’s ALLL is one of 
the most important functions of any examination” (Federal Reserve Board of Governors 1999).
In verifying the adequacy of ALLL, examiners consider information obtained during the current 
and prior exams, loan quality trends and peer group data, processes for internal credit review, 
past-due and restructured loans, and economic conditions.  If after considering these factors an 
examiner finds that a bank’s ALLL is too low, the institution normally is required to increase its 
provision expense and raise ALLL to an appropriate level. 
The supervisory assessment of ALLL occurs in the context of the rating system used in 
safety and soundness exams.  Under the Uniform Financial Institutions Rating System adopted in 
1979, a bank’s overall, or composite, safety and soundness rating was derived from the on-site 
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1 In addition, because the amount of Tier 2 capital is restricted to be no greater than the amount of Tier 1
capital, banks raising Tier 1 capital by making fewer provisions than necessary may in some cases be able to boost
Tier 2 capital as well.evaluation and rating of five separate factors—capital adequacy (C), asset quality (A),
management (M), earnings (E), and liquidity (L).  This CAMEL rating was amended on January 
1, 1997, to include a sixth component.  The new S component focuses on sensitivity to market
risk, such as the risk arising from changes in interest rates.  The new S component was not 
expected to affect the composite ratings assigned to banks, and like the earlier CAMEL rating, 
the CAMELS overall rating has five levels:  1—basically sound in every respect; 2—
fundamentally sound but with modest weaknesses; 3—financial, operational, or compliance
weaknesses that cause supervisory concern; 4—serious financial weaknesses that could impair
future viability; and 5—critical financial weaknesses that render the probability of near-term
failure extremely high.  For simplicity, we apply the term CAMELS to both CAMEL and 
CAMELS ratings.
Currently, CAMELS ratings are assigned using the so-called “risk-focused” approach to 
exams, which as described below continues to give central importance to the assessment of 
ALLL.
2  Under this approach, examiners target areas likely to pose the greatest risk to an 
examined institution.  By targeting the areas of greatest risk, exams can promote safety and 
soundness more effectively, while imposing a lower burden on the examined institutions.  The 
risk-focused approach relies on examiner discretion to determine the scope and emphasis of a 
particular exam, but the so-called “primary examination procedure modules” are normally
included in every exam, two of which include facets addressing the adequacy of a bank’s ALLL 
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2 The Federal Reserve System began implementing a risk-focused approach in 1997. Spillenkothen
(1997a) and Spillenkothen (1997b) describe the risk-focused framework for large complex institutions and
community banks, respectively.  As the risk-focused framework continues to evolve, the treatment of ALLL has
retained its prominence. Spillenkothen (2001) provides an interagency (Federal Reserve, FDIC, OCC, and OTS)
policy statement on ALLL methodologies and documentation; the policy statement reiterates the commitment of the
banking agencies to assess the adequacy of ALLL in exams.and the reliability of published financial statements.
3  The module on management and internal 
control evaluation instructs examiners to consider the accuracy of the bank’s call report and to 
determine whether the bank has a history of call report amendments.  Moreover, this module also 
instructs examiners to assess whether the bank is monitoring risk effectively; included in this 
assessment is a consideration of the adequacy of ALLL.  Related assessments are also prominent
in the module for evaluating loan portfolio management and review.  Two of the twelve primary
steps in this module involve ALLL; one step evaluates the method using in establishing the 
ALLL balance, while the other focuses on the adequacy of that balance.  One of the points of 
evaluation deals with whether controls exist to ensure compliance with accounting standards.  In 
addition, if the primary analysis of loan portfolio management and review indicates risks are not 
adequately managed, additional analyses of ALLL are triggered.
2.3.  Previous research on exams and ALLL 
Several studies support the view that troubled banks often have insufficient ALLL and 
that exams are important in helping correct the problem.  The General Accounting Office (1990, 
1991) finds troubled or failing banks frequently have insufficient ALLL.  Similarly, Berger, 
King, and O’Brien (1991) discuss the potential for insufficient ALLL, particularly when a bank 
has not been examined recently.  Gilbert (1993) finds abnormally large reductions in capital 
ratios occur when supervisors downgrade troubled banks.  Dahl, O’Keefe, and Hanweck (1998) 
conclude that exams influence the recognition of losses on commercial and industrial loans.  And 
Curry, O'Keefe, Coburn, and Montgomery (1999) find banks that supervisors have downgraded 
or subjected to regulatory enforcement actions increase their provision expense. 
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3 The parlance used in this discussion is that for community banks. While large, complex institutions are 
discussed using different terms, their risk-focused examinations also include a review of ALLL as a basic
component.Setting provisions requires detailed knowledge about a bank’s loan portfolio.  Bank 
managers are more likely than outsiders to have such detailed knowledge.  Through exams,
supervisors may gain knowledge about the adequacy of ALLL.  If an exam aligns provision 
expense and ALLL with credit quality, it may facilitate the public communication of important 
bank-specific information and thereby enhance banking system transparency.  Consistent with 
this view, Docking, Hirschey, and Jones (1997) find a bank’s announcement of loan-loss 
provisions adversely affects both that bank’s stock price and sometimes the stock price of other 
banks as well.  Berger and Davies (1998) provide evidence that quarterly financial statements are 
a conduit for transmitting exam findings to financial markets.  And Flannery and Houston (1999) 
find exams affect the relationship between a bank holding company’s market and book value, 
possibly reflecting the improved accuracy of financial statements following an exam or a 
certification effect whereby exams serve as a stamp of approval on published financial 
statements.
Other researchers have reached a different conclusion, however, arguing essentially that 
outsiders can see through a bank’s loan-loss accounting and discern the true quality of its loans, 
even if provisions and ALLL are lower than necessary.  Bruner and Simms (1987), Musumeci
and Sinkey (1990a, 1990b) and Beaver and Engel (1996) suggest investors effectively estimate
the extent of the deterioration in bank loan portfolios.  If without substantial cost outsiders can 
indeed accurately estimate losses in a bank’s loan portfolio on the basis of other information, the 
benefits of exams in assessing loan quality and the sufficiency of ALLL may be limited mostly
to the supervisory process itself, as opposed to the promotion of financial transparency in 
general.
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3.1.  Revisions and sample design 
The annual data this study uses are limited to commercial banks for the period from 1996 
through 1998.  Banks less than four years old are excluded, since young banks typically exhibit 
unique financial characteristics and are not directly comparable to more mature banks.  The 
resulting sample contains 25,514 end-of-year call reports. 
The originally reported data are from files transmitted from the Federal Reserve Board,
seventy to eighty days following the report dates.  The revised data are for the same report dates 
but were transmitted from the Board in May 2000.  Any differences between the original data 
and the data obtained in May reflect revisions made sometime after the data were published as 
“final,” which typically occurs about sixty-five days after the report date.
3.2.  Variables 
We analyze twelve financial ratios corresponding to the main categories of financial 
factors considered in supervisory exams of financial safety and soundness.  Balance-sheet 
variables are scaled by end-of-period gross assets, while income-statement variables are
expressed relative to average assets for the period.  It is not difficult to envision additional 
measures relevant to the categories we consider, but some degree of parsimony is necessary to 
maintain tractability.  In any event, alternative measures under a particular category tend to be 
highly correlated. 
In addition to analyzing revisions to each of the twelve financial ratios we consider, we 
also use these ratios to assess the degree to which banks with financial problems may have a 
relatively high incidence of adverse financial statement revisions, especially upward revisions to 
provision expense.  Such revisions provide a convenient focal point for the analysis, given the 
central role of loan loss provisions and ALLL in accounting for asset quality problems.  To the 
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additional provisions, it may be in the interest of supervisors to devote special attention to these 
banks, even to the point of moving up a scheduled exam visit.
Total equity capital (CAPITAL) is a measure of capital adequacy.  High values for this 
variable indicate financial strength and should reduce the chances of an upward revision to 
provision expense.  A similar effect should be associated with high levels of loan loss reserves 
(RESERVES), all else equal.  However, reserves represent coverage for loan losses that have not 
yet been taken but are nevertheless expected and embedded in the current portfolio.  As a result, 
we would expect a negative effect of reserves on upward revisions to provision expense only to 
the extent that the embedded losses themselves are fully represented by other variables included 
in the regressions.  Otherwise, by reflecting the presence of problem assets, RESERVES could be 
positively associated with upward revisions to provision expense.
Asset quality problems are captured through six variables, each of which is expected to 
increase the chances of an upward revision to provision expense.  Problem assets themselves are 
represented by loans past due 90 days or more and still accruing (PAST-DUE 90), nonaccrual
loans (NONACCRUAL), and other real estate owned (OTHER REAL ESTATE), which consists 
primarily of foreclosed real estate.
4  In addition, net loan charge-offs (CHARGE-OFFS) and 
provision for loan losses (PROVISIONS) are also included. The final variable included to capture 
asset quality problems is income earned on loans but not collected (INC NOT COLLECTED).
This latter variable represents interest payments that are still accruing, even though they have not 
been collected.
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4 Loans are reported in nonaccrual status if they are maintained on a cash basis because of deterioration in
the financial condition of the borrower, payment in full of principal or interest is not expected, or principal or 
interest has been in default for 90 days or more. An exception to this last condition occurs if a loan is both well
secured and in the process of collection.Measures of earnings and liquidity complete our list of financial ratios.  Earnings are 
represented by net income (RETURN ON ASSETS) and as a signal of financial strength are 
expected to reduce the chances of an upward revision to provision expense.  As a measure of 
liquidity, investment securities (SECURITIES) should reduce the chances of an upward revision 
to provision expense, as should high holdings of cash and net fed funds sold (CASH).
5  In 
contrast, by subjecting a bank to higher costs and a potentially less stable funding base, a high 
reliance on large CDs (LARGE CDs) might have the opposite effect on revisions to provision 
expense.
4.  Results 
While we focus on exam driven revisions, not all of the call report revisions we observe 
are attributable to exams.  In fact, other types of revisions are also likely to occur, reflecting the 
combined effect of a host of influences, such as random error, routine data checks, or the 
findings of internal or external auditors.  Unfortunately, there is no indicator to identify for us the 
ultimate source of each revision.  We are left then with the challenge of identifying statistically
the degree to which the revisions are associated with exams.
4.1.  Exams and the incidence of revisions 
Table 1 divides the observations into five groups corresponding to a bank’s exam status 
in the year immediately following a year-end call report date.  The first group contains banks for 
which an exam was opened in the first quarter, the second group contains banks not examined
until the second quarter, and so on for the third and fourth groups.  The fifth group contains 
banks that were not examined at all in the year following the call report date.  For each financial
ratio and each of the five groups, Table 1 shows the percentage of observations for which a 
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5 Investment securities tend to be more liquid than loans.  In addition, they typically carry lower credit risk.
Given the strong negative correlation that exists between the holdings of these two interest-bearing assets, we
include only one in the analysis.positive revision occurred and also the percentage with a negative revision.  Here, revisions are
identified based on changes to the numerator of each financial ratio, irrespective of whether the 
denominator (assets) was also revised.
The statistics on the incidence of revisions suggest a significant number resulted from
exam findings.  Looking first at the results for the capital ratio (CAPITAL), 6.3 percent of the 
banks examined in the first quarter revised their previous reported year-end level of capital
downward.  The incidence of downward revisions then declines for the groups corresponding to 
more distant exams, falling to 2.8 percent for banks that were not examined at all.  In contrast, 
the incidence of positive revisions to capital is relatively low and constant across the five groups 
of banks.  These patterns conform closely to the idea that because examiners focus on downside 
risk, they are more prone to require call report revisions when exam findings are adverse.  The 
data also are consistent with the intuitive notion that examiners would be more likely to require
revisions to relatively recent call reports, rather than call reports filed in the distant past.  A sign 
test indicates the observed differences between the incidence of positive and negative revisions
to capital are statistically significant.  In addition, a Pearson chi-square test statistic rejects the 
null hypothesis of no association between the incidence of revisions (positive, negative, or none) 
and the incidence of exams (first, second, third, or fourth quarter, or none). 
The pattern of adverse revisions to previous year-end capital levels, especially at banks 
examined near the beginning of the year, is apparent for several of the other variables as well.
As shown in Table 1, revisions to loan loss reserves (RESERVES) tend to be positive, consistent 
with the view that examiners sometimes find the level of reserves to be inadequate.  Similarly,
loan charge-offs (CHARGE-OFFS) and provision for loan losses (PROVISIONS) also tend to be 
revised upward, while net income (RETURN ON ASSETS) is restated at lower levels.  Finally, 
the level of interest payments accrued but not collected (INC NOT COLLECTED) and past-due 
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nonaccrual status.
In a manner similar to the procedure used for Table 1, the same five groups of 
observations are analyzed in Table 2, but now revisions are identified based on all changes to the 
financial ratios, whether they resulted from revisions to the numerator, denominator, or both.
While the incidence of revisions is now higher, the general pattern of revisions observed in Table 
1 is repeated in Table 2 for CAPITAL, RESERVES, CHARGE-OFFS, PROVISIONS, and 
RETURN ON ASSETS.  However, unlike in Table 1, investment securities (SECURITIES), cash 
and net fed funds sold (CASH), and holdings of large CDs (LARGE CDs) now tend to show 
positive revisions for banks examined in the first quarter, reflecting the preponderance of 
negative revisions to gross assets for this group of banks. 
If exams lead banks to correct the underreporting of financial losses, then adverse 
revisions to financial statements might be especially prevalent in cases where examiners find that
a bank’s financial condition has deteriorated to a sufficient degree to warrant a downgrade in the 
bank’s safety and soundness rating.  In this regard, the incidence of revisions at downgraded 
banks provides further evidence that a significant number were the result of exam findings, as the 
pattern of adverse revisions shown in Tables 1 and 2 is even more apparent when the examined
banks are grouped according to whether a supervisory downgrade occurred.
In Tables 3 and 4, the first group contains banks for which a downgrade occurred through 
an exam opened in the first quarter, the second group contains banks downgraded in the second 
quarter, and so on for the third and fourth groups.  The fifth group contains banks that were 
examined in the year following the call report date, but not downgraded.  Among the banks 
downgraded in the first quarter, 18.2 percent revised their previous reported year-end level of 
capital downward, as shown in Table 3.  This high rate of revision falls to 2.9 percent for banks 
- 13 -downgraded in the fourth quarter and 4.2 percent for the banks that were examined, but not 
downgraded.  The results in Table 3 for revisions to the numerators of RESERVES, PAST-DUE
90, CHARGE-OFFS, PROVISIONS, INC NOT COLLECTED, and RETURN ON ASSETS also 
exhibit an exaggerated version of the general patterns shown in Table 1, strongly suggesting that 
adverse exam findings are responsible for a significant number of the revisions observed in the 
call report numbers.  Similar results are reported in Table 4, where revisions are identified for the 
downgraded banks based on any changes to the financial ratios, whether they resulted from
revisions to the numerator, denominator, or both. 
The finding that adverse revisions to financial statements are associated with exam
findings points to a role for exams in uncovering financial problems and ensuring bank 
accounting statements reflect them.  An important aspect of the analysis is that the period from
which the financial statements are drawn, 1996-98, was a relatively tranquil time for the banking 
sector.  Because financial problems were few, any need for increases in provisions could be 
expected to have been low.  The relatively benign operating environment most likely helped hold 
to a minimum the number of data revisions in our sample, as the vast majority of exams merely 
confirmed that individual banks remained financially sound.  We would expect both the 
percentage of banks with upward revisions to provision expense and the difference in the 
incidence of these revisions between examined and unexamined banks to climb during a banking 
downturn.
4.2.  Controlling for financial condition 
If exam activity happens to be centered on banks with financial problems, then the 
correlation observed in Tables 1 through 4 between exam activity and call report revisions might
simply reflect a greater tendency for troubled banks to revise their financial statements, as 
opposed to a direct revision effect of exams themselves.  However, to the extent that the various 
- 14 -financial ratios we have examined effectively capture the financial condition of individual banks, 
then by using a regression to hold these variables constant, we can eliminate the associated
omitted variables bias.  Toward this end, we now regress the incidence of revisions on not only 
indicators for exam activity, but also the twelve financial ratios analyzed in Tables 1-4, the log of 
total assets (SIZE), and the rating assigned in a bank’s most recent safety and soundness exam
(CAMELS-1).
Rather than conducting separate regression analyses for revisions to each of the financial 
ratios, we focus on upward revisions to provision expense.  As discussed earlier, loan loss 
provisions may play a key role in conveying to market participants timely information regarding 
any deterioration in asset quality, and the need for additions to ALLL is of primary supervisory
concern.  Moreover, the results in Tables 1 through 4 document both a high incidence of upward 
revisions to provision expense and a significant degree of correlation with exam activity.
Reflecting these considerations, the dependent variable, REVISION, is equal to one if provision 
expense was revised upward, and zero otherwise. 
In preparation for the regression results, Table 5 shows the variable means for banks 
categorized according to whether they revised their provision expense upward (REVISION = 1).
Based on these comparisons, banks that revised differ substantially from those that did not.  With
the exception of SIZE and RESERVES, each of the variables is correlated with the incidence of 
revisions, using both the originally reported and revised data.  There is no evidence of a location 
shift in the distribution of SIZE between banks that revised and those that did not.  Based on the 
revised data only, the incidence of revisions is associated with high RESERVES.  With regard to 
the other variables, revising banks tend to be financially weaker than non-revising banks (worse 
CAMELS-1, lower CAPITAL, higher PAST-DUE 90, NONACCRUAL, OTHER REAL ESTATE,
CHARGE-OFFS, PROVISIONS, INC NOT COLLECTED, lower ROA and SECURITIES, and 
- 15 -higher LARGE CDs).  An apparent exception occurs with CASH, which is higher for revising 
banks.
In Table 6, we report the ordinary least-squares and probit regression results for the
incidence of upward revisions to provision expense.  Two versions of each regression are 
estimated, one whether the explanatory variables are based on the originally reported data and 
one using the revised data.  In addition to the covariates shown in Table 5, four indicators of 
exam activity are included in the regressions. EXAM1 is a binary indicator for whether a bank’s 
first exam in the year immediately following a year-end call report occurred in the first quarter, 
EXAM2 is a binary indicator for banks examined in the second quarter, and so on for EXAM3 and 
EXAM4.  In explaining upward revisions to provision expense, we use the occurrence of an 
exam, rather than that of a supervisory downgrade, as our measure of exam activity.  Because 
downgrades reflect exam findings, they may be as much the result of financial statement
revisions as the other way around.  In this way, we view revisions and downgrades as being in 
many cases the joint result of exams.
While there are some differences between the estimates based on the originally reported
data and those based on revised data, overall the results indicate banks are more likely to 
originally underreport financial losses, as suggested by subsequent upward revisions to provision 
expense, when their financial condition is substandard.  In at least two of the four regressions, 
the probability of revision is associated with worse CAMELS-1, lower RESERVES, higher PAST-
DUE 90, NONACCRUAL, OTHER REAL ESTATE, and PROVISIONS, lower ROA and 
SECURITIES, and higher LARGE CDs.
Of particular interest are the results for the variables based on exam activity.  The 
coefficient on EXAM1 is positive and significant in each of the four regressions, and EXAM2 is 
- 16 -positive and significant in three cases.
6  These findings, after controlling for the financial 
condition of individual banks, point to an auditing role for exams in leading to the restatement of 
financial results to reflect a greater degree of financial difficulty than originally reported.
4.3.  Instrumental variables 
The regression analysis in Table 6 eliminates the potential for omitted variables bias only
to the extent that our list of explanatory variables includes all the factors that help determine
revisions and exams, which is admittedly unlikely.  To control more fully for omitted variables
bias, we now consider explicitly the potential determinants of exam activity.  More specifically,
we attempt to identify an instrument which is correlated with exams, but otherwise unrelated to 
revisions.  To be valid, the instrument must be uncorrelated with any relevant variables that have 
been omitted from the revisions regression and the regression error.  Such an instrument would 
allow us to use the exogenous component of exam activity to obtain a pure estimate of the 
relationship between exams and revisions. 
In the instrumental variables analysis, we focus on exam activity in the first two quarters
of the year immediately following a year-end call report, as suggested by the regression results in 
Table 6, which point to these exams as having a potentially significant effect on revisions to the 
year-end data.  The first stage then involves estimating a linear regression for EXAM, a binary 
indicator for whether a bank’s first exam in the year immediately following a year-end call report 
occurred in the first half.  A linear specification for the first-stage regression is motivated by the 
fact that two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimates based on a linear probability model are
6 We also interact time (quarters) since the last exam with a single indicator variable for exams conducted
in the first and second quarters, to see if a relatively long length of time since the last exam might heighten the
tendency for the current exam to result in revisions. However, this interaction term is insignificant in both OLS
regressions and the probit regression based on originally reported data.  In the probit regression using revised data,
this term possesses the expected positive sign and is significant, but only at the 5-percent level.  The other results
from the regression are unaffected by the interaction term.  Overall, we are unable to find convincing evidence for 
- 17 -consistent whether or not the first-stage conditional expectation function is actually linear, 
whereas a nonlinear specification for the first stage (such as logit or probit) generates consistent 
second-stage estimates only if the nonlinear specification chosen for the first stage is exactly 
correct [see Angrist (2001) and Angrist and Krueger (2001)]. 
Regarding the second stage, even if the underlying relationship is nonlinear, linear 
instrumental variables estimates generally are successful in identifying average effects, and the 
2SLS estimates of such effects are typically similar to the estimates produced by more general 
estimation strategies.  Angrist (1991) shows that 2SLS estimation produces results similar to the 
average treatment effect estimated in a bivariate probit model.  Evans, Farrelly, and Montgomery
(1999) provide a nice example of the linear instrumental variables technique when the outcome
of interest and the potentially endogenous variable are both discrete, as is the case here.
To obtain consistent estimates of the impact of exams on financial statement revisions in 
the 2SLS regressions, we must possess a variable that induces revisions only through the 
occurrence of exams.  In this regard, the supervisory agencies operate under frequency 
guidelines dictating that banks be examined at least once every 18 months.  More specifically, 
the guidelines allow an 18-month exam cycle for 1- and 2-rated banks with total assets less than 
or equal to $250 million, while other banks are required to be examined at least once every 12 
months (Board of Governors 2000).  These guidelines have a substantial influence on the timing
of exams, but absence the actual occurrence of an exam, where a bank stands in its exam cycle 
would not be expected to influence whether or not the bank would revise a prior call report.  We
use as an instrument the number of quarters left in a bank’s exam cycle, as of the call report date 
(FREQUENCY).
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the notion that an exam conducted following a relatively lengthy period of no exam activity is more likely to result
in revisions.Table 7 shows the variable means for banks according to whether or not they were 
examined in the first two quarters of the year immediately following a year-end call report 
(EXAM=1), using both original and revised values.  The occurrence of an exam is associated 
with a low amount of time remaining in a bank’s exam cycle (FREQUENCY).  Examined banks 
also have worse (higher) values of CAMELS-1 than unexamined banks, suggesting examiners
direct increased attention to known supervisory problems.  Also, in several cases, the differences 
in means suggest exam activity is directed at financially troubled banks.  Using either the 
original or revised data, exams are associated with high PAST-DUE 90, NONACCRUAL,
PROVISIONS, and INC NOT COLLECTED, and low RETURN ON ASSETS.
The 2SLS regression results are shown in Table 8.  The first two columns contain the 
results for EXAM, using original and revised data, respectively.  The less time remaining in the 
exam frequency guidelines, the more likely is an exam, as indicated by the negative and highly 
significant estimated effect of FREQUENCY.  In addition, EXAM is associated with a small asset 
base (SIZE), a poor supervisory rating (CAMELS-1), and low liquidity (CASH).  The results also 
indicate high levels of foreclosed real estate reduce the chances of an exam.  This unexpected 
finding may reflect a tendency for holdings of foreclosed real estate to remain relatively high for 
a significant length of time after a bank has recovered from a round of asset quality difficulties.
The results for REVISION are shown in the third and fourth columns of Table 8.  Most 
importantly, the coefficient on EXAM is positive and significant, using either original or revised 
data.  The 2SLS estimates for the remaining variables are virtually identical to the single-
equation estimates presented earlier in Table 6. The finding of a significant auditing role for 
exams in leading to the restatement of financial results to reflect a greater degree of financial 
- 19 -difficulty than originally reported is robust with respect to all our attempts to control for omitted
variables bias.
7
4.4.  Financial significance of revisions 
While we have found substantial evidence that exams are effective in uncovering 
financial problems and ensuring financial statements reflect them, are the revisions financially 
significant?  To help answer this question, Table 9 shows the means of the twelve financial ratios 
for banks that were examined in the first half of the year (EXAM=1) and revised their provision 
expense upward (REVISION=1), using both the originally reported and subsequently revised 
data.  On average, the level of PROVISIONS rose over 60 basis points.  As would be expected, 
RETURN ON ASSETS and CAPITAL were also revised at most of these banks, both falling over 
50 basis points, on average.
8
From a safety and soundness standpoint, these changes appear to be significant.  In 
further support of this view, in another study [Gunther and Moore (forthcoming)] we find that 
the relationship between accounting data and safety and soundness ratings is significantly 
stronger for the revised data than for the data as originally reported.  The originally reported data 
7 To determine whether pooling affects the results, we also estimate the 2SLS regressions separately for 
each of the three year-end call report dates included in the analysis.  The resulting coefficient estimates for EXAM
are positive and significant in each of the three years.  The estimates and their standard errors are as follows: for
1996, the original data yield .0142 (.0045) and the revised data give .0132 (.0044); for 1997, the original data give
.0150 (.0044) and the revised .0138 (.0042); for 1998, the corresponding estimates are .0209 (.0043) and .0196
(.0042).
8 It may be useful at this point to highlight the fact that it is not necessary for the revisions observed for two 
related variables to match, or add up.  Some remaining differences may reflect the use of different denominators for
ratios using balance-sheet versus income-statement variables in the numerator.  In addition, other variables may also
have been revised.  To illustrate this latter case, as indicated in Table 9 there are seven observations for which a 
bank was examined and provision expense was revised upward, although capital was not revised. Taken in
isolation, this would seem to violate the accounting constraint whereby higher provision expense would reduce net
income, retained earnings, and ultimately capital.  However, for these seven seemingly anomalous cases, additional
variables were revised, resulting in no change to net income and hence no change in capital (or gross assets).
Specifically, five of the seven observations had revisions to noninterest expense that exactly offset the revision to
provision expense.  One of the seven had an increase in noninterest income that exactly offset the increase in 
provision expense.  Finally, another had revisions to net interest income, noninterest income, and noninterest
expense that together exactly offset the revision to provision expense. Similar considerations apply to other
- 20 -often understate emerging financial weaknesses, to the extent that the capacity of the original 
data to distinguish problem from nonproblem banks, as viewed from a supervisory perspective, 
is compromised.
The magnitude of the revisions is also apparent in a comparison of the distribution of 
RETURN ON ASSETS, before and after revisions.  In Figure 2, we show the proportion of 
observations within 50 basis points of each value of profitability for banks with EXAM=1 and 
REVISION=1, first using the originally reported data and then using the revised data.  For 
purposes of further comparison, we also show the same distribution for all observations, using 
the revised data.  As shown in Figure 2, banks that were examined and revised provision expense 
upward were not as profitable as banks on average, even before revising provisions to reflect the 
actual extent of their financial difficulty.  However, once the additional provisions were made,
the banks’ profitably was reduced further, and by an order of magnitude similar to their original
shortfall.
4.5.  Exams and revisions at highly rated banks 
The results above document the role of exams in identifying financial losses and ensuring 
that bank accounting statements reflect them.  In this section, we estimate the 2SLS regressions
again, except this time we obtain separate estimates for nonproblem banks (CAMELS-1 = 1 or 2) 
and problem banks (CAMELS-1 = 3, 4, or 5).  There are 24,519 observations for the nonproblem
banks and 995 problem-bank observations. 
Our objective is to determine whether the auditing role of exams is important only for 
banks with known problems, or whether exam-based revisions to financial statements also occur 
at highly rated institutions.  Banks with a composite rating of 4 or 5 are obviously viewed as 
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apparent exceptions, such as the four cases where a bank was examined and revised provision expense upward, but
did not revise reserves.problem banks, and 3-rated banks are sometimes referred to as problems as well.  Recall that a 2-
rating is for banks that are fundamentally sound but with modest weaknesses, whereas a 3-rating 
corresponds to financial, operational, or compliance weaknesses that cause supervisory concern.
In this sense, a rating of 3 brings a bank into transitional status, from which point further
deterioration is not uncommon.  Generally speaking, once a bank moves to a 3-rating, 
supervisors tend to increase direct inspection efforts relative to off-site efforts based on call 
report data.  This tendency is embodied in the exam frequency guidelines themselves, which 
allow a longer exam cycle for 1- and 2-rated banks, as discussed earlier. As a result, a finding of 
significant accounting revisions at 1- and 2-rated banks would have important supervisory 
implications, since supervisors typically rely heavily on the accounting numbers in monitoring
changes in the financial condition of highly rated banks.  In other words, such a finding would 
indicate the original call report data may be unreliable at the point where they are relied upon the 
most.
The results in Table 10 for nonproblem banks are broadly similar to those for the full 
sample.  Exams and indicators of financial weakness are associated with a heightened probability 
of upward revisions to provision expense.  These findings are important because they indicate 
exams uncover accounting misstatements at banks not already formally identified as problems.
Nevertheless, the financially weakest of the highly rated banks are the most likely to require 
revisions.
Table 11 shows the regression results for banks rated 3, 4, or 5 at their most recent prior 
exam.  For these banks, EXAM is significant only in the model estimated using revised data.
However, significance levels in general are lower for the subset of banks previous identified as
supervisory problems, most likely reflecting, at least in part, the smaller sample size.
- 22 -5.  Conclusion 
Evidence from a unique set of data containing both originally reported and subsequently 
revised financial variables indicates banks are more likely to originally underreport financial 
losses when their financial performance is substandard.  In addition, our analysis documents an 
important role for supervisory exams in uncovering financial problems and ensuring bank 
accounting statements reflect them.
Interestingly, the auditing role of exams is evident not only for institutions previously 
identified as supervisory concerns, but actually is also apparent at highly rated banks, where 
financial problems are only just emerging.  This finding highlights the risk of relying on reported 
financial statements in monitoring changes in the financial condition of 1- and 2-rated banks.
Partially mitigating this risk are the results showing that indicators of financial weakness can be 
used to identify banks that are the most likely to require additional provisions.  Based on this 
finding, it may be in the interest of supervisors to devote special attention to the highly rated 
banks that appear the weakest based on call report data, even to the point of moving up a 
scheduled exam visit. 
The primary implication of our findings that we wish to emphasize concerns the efficacy
of the supervisory process during a banking downturn.  Our results indicate the incidence of loss 
underreporting would increase as financial conditions worsened.  Because an increasing number
of troubled institutions would demand additional supervisory attention, fewer resources might
then be left for routine exams.  Based on our finding that exams play an important role in 
uncovering financial misstatements, even at highly rated institutions, we would expect any 
reduction in supervisory resources available for routine exams to delay the correction of the 
rising number of underreported losses.  The resulting deterioration in the quality of financial data 
could then impede the operation of supervisory and market discipline.  These considerations
- 23 -highlight the value of efforts to maintain or bolster the supervisory system’s capacity to expand 
exam activity quickly and substantially in the event of a banking downturn. 
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Figure 1: Provision Expense
Percent of Assets
The figures shown are the mean values for all commercial banks.
a
aFigure 2: Distribution of RETURN ON ASSETS (Percent) for Banks with 
EXAM =1 and REVISION =1, Before and After Revisions, and for All Observations
a
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aThe figures shown are based on a kernel density estimator, , where K(x)=1 if |x|<.5, and
zero otherwise, N is the number of observations, and xi is 100 · RETURN ON ASSETS.
bBased on observations for which EXAM=1 and REVISION=1.
- 28 -Table 1: Incidence (Percent) of Revisions
a to Numerators of Financial Ratios
b, by Quarter of Exam
Quarter of exam
c







































































































































































































































Observations 5,426 4,780 4,542 3,514 7,252
- 29 -Notes to Table 1
a Revisions are measured as the difference between the call report data as obtained in May 2000, and the original values of these
data obtained when the data were first published as “final,” about 65 days after the report date.  Listed are the percentages of
observations in each category for which the data were revised upward and downward, respectively.
b The figures are for revisions to the numerators of the financial ratios, irrespective of whether the denominator (assets) was
revised.  CAPITAL, equity capital; RESERVES, loan loss reserves; PAST-DUE 90, loans past-due 90 days or more and still 
accruing; NONACCRUAL, nonaccrual loans; OTHER REAL ESTATE, other real estate owned; CHARGE-OFFS, loan charge-
offs less recoveries; PROVISIONS, provision for loan losses; INC NOT COLLECTED, income earned but not collected;
RETURN ON ASSETS, net income; SECURITIES, investment securities; CASH, cash plus net fed funds sold; LARGE CDs,
certificates of deposit of $100,000 or more. CAPITAL, RESERVES, PAST-DUE 90, NONACCRUAL, OTHER REAL ESTATE,
INC NOT COLLECTED, SECURITIES, CASH, and LARGE CDs are end-of-period values, scaled by end-of-period assets.
CHARGE-OFFS, PROVISIONS, and RETURN ON ASSETS are annual values, divided by average assets for the year. The call 
report and exam data are from the Federal Reserve Board.
c The date of the first exam occurring in the year immediately following a year-end call report.  The year-end call reports are 
from 1996-98.
d Significance levels (italics) are based on the Pearson chi-square test statistic for the null hypothesis of no association between
the incidence of revisions (positive, negative, or none) and the incidence of exams (first, second, third, and fourth quarter, or
none).  The alternative hypothesis is general association.
e Significance levels (italics) are for the sign test based on the binomial distribution, under the assumption that upward and
downward revisions are equally likely.  Let x correspond to the number of either upward or downward revisions, whichever is
lower, and let y be the total number of revisions. The significance level shown is the probability of observing x or a lower
value, given y.
- 30 -Table 2: Incidence (Percent) of Revisions to Financial Ratios, by Quarter of Exam
a
Quarter of exam





































































































































































































































Observations 5,426 4,780 4,542 3,514 7,252
a The figures are for revisions to the financial ratios resulting from changes to the numerator, denominator (assets), or both.
- 31 -Table 3: Incidence (Percent) of Revisions to Numerators of Financial Ratios, by Quarter of Supervisory Downgrade
Quarter of downgrade
a





































































































































































































































Observations 483 435 432 349 16,563
- 32 -Notes to Table 3
a Composite safety and soundness ratings have five levels: 1—basically sound in every respect; 2—fundamentally sound but 
with modest weaknesses; 3—financial, operational, or compliance weaknesses that cause supervisory concern; 4—serious
financial weaknesses that could impair future viability; and 5—critical financial weaknesses that render the probability of near-
term failure extremely high. A downgrade occurs when a bank receives a worse rating on its current exam than on its previous
one. The quarters correspond to the date of the first exam occurring in the year immediately following a year-end call report.
The year-end call reports are from 1996-98.  The fifth column contains figures for banks that were examined during the year 
but not downgraded. No significance level is shown for cases where no revision occurred.
- 33 -Table 4: Incidence (Percent) of Revisions to Financial Ratios, by Quarter of Supervisory Downgrade
Quarter of downgrade





































































































































































































































Observations 483 435 432 349 16,563
- 34 -Table 5: Variable Means, by REVISION
  a
Original data Revised data
REVISION = 0 REVISION  = 1 p-value
 b REVISION = 0 REVISION = 1 p-value
 b
SIZE
 c 11.32 11.16 .151 11.32 11.16 .144
CAMELS-1
 d  1.56 2.23 .001 1.56 2.23 .001
CAPITAL
 e 10.17 9.48 .001 10.17 9.02 .001
RESERVES
 e .87 .95 .316 .87 1.25 .001
PAST-DUE 90
 e .21 .52 .001 .21 .46 .001
NONACCRUAL
 e .37 .90 .001 .37 .91 .001
OTHER REAL ESTATE
 e .13 .32 .001 .13 .36 .001
CHARGE-OFFS
 e .16 .51 .001 .16 .80 .001
PROVISIONS
 e .21 .61 .001 .21 1.20 .001
INC NOT COLLECTED
 e .67 .72 .018 .67 .72 .047
RETURN ON ASSETS
 e 1.21 .67 .001 1.20 .20 .001
SECURITIES
 e 27.99 21.51 .001 27.99 21.53 .001
CASH
 e 8.85 10.61 .001 8.85 10.62 .001
LARGE CDs
 e 10.05 12.17 .001 10.06 12.17 .001
Observations 25,178 336 25,178 336
aREVISION is a binary variable for whether a bank revised its provision expense (numerator of PROVISIONS) upward.
bFor CAMELS-1, significance levels are based on the Pearson chi-square test statistic for the null hypothesis of no association
with REVISION.  Significance levels for the remaining variables are based on the Wilcoxon test statistic for a shift in location
parameter.
c SIZE is log of total assets. 
d CAMELS-1 is the previous safety and soundness rating.
e The financial ratios are multiplied by 100.
- 35 -Table 6: Regression Results for REVISION
  a
Ordinary least squares Probit





























































































































































aStandard errors are in parentheses. * Significant at the 1-percent level. † Significant at the 5-percent level.
b EXAM1 is a binary indicator for whether a bank’s first exam in the year immediately following a year-end call report occurred
in the first quarter, EXAM2 is a binary indicator for banks examined in the second quarter, and so on for EXAM3 and EXAM4.
- 36 -Table 7: Variable Means, by EXAM
 a
Original data Revised data
EXAM = 0 EXAM = 1 p-value
 b EXAM = 0 EXAM = 1 p-value
 b
FREQUENCY
c 4.16 2.22 .001 4.16 2.22 .001
SIZE 11.32 11.32 .368 11.32 11.32 .367
CAMELS-1 1.55 1.61 .001 1.55 1.61 .001
CAPITAL
 d 10.19 10.11 .892 10.19 10.10 .925
RESERVES
 d .86 .88 .001 .86 .89 .001
PAST-DUE 90
 d .21 .23 .046 .21 .23 .043
NONACCRUAL
 d .36 .40 .001 .36 .40 .001
OTHER REAL ESTATE
 d .14 .14 .454 .14 .14 .414
CHARGE-OFFS
 d .16 .17 .203 .16 .18 .097
PROVISIONS
 d .21 .23 .001 .21 .24 .001
INC NOT COLLECTED
 d .67 .68 .035 .67 .68 .037
RETURN ON ASSETS
 d 1.22 1.17 .019 1.21 1.16 .004
SECURITIES
 d 27.95 27.84 .761 27.96 27.83 .748
CASH
 d 8.94 8.76 .109 8.94 8.76 .108
LARGE CDs
 d 10.03 10.16 .484 10.03 10.16 .479
Observations 15,308 10,206 15,308 10,206
a EXAM is a binary indicator for whether a bank’s first exam in the year immediately following a year-end call report occurred
in the first half.
bFor FREQUENCY and CAMELS-1, significance levels are based on the Pearson chi-square test statistic for the null hypothesis
of no association with EXAM.  Significance levels for the remaining variables are based on the Wilcoxon test statistic for a shift
in location parameter.
c FREQUENCY is the number of quarters remaining in the exam frequency guidelines.
d The financial ratios are multiplied by 100.
- 37 -Table 8: Two-Stage Least Squares Regression Results for REVISION
EXAM REVISION

































































































































* Significant at the 1-percent level. † Significant at the 5-percent level.
- 38 -Table 9: Means of Financial Ratios




































PROVISIONS -. 5 8 1 . 2 1
(211)
10.39*

























a The variables are multiplied by 100.  The number of observations is in parentheses.
b The observations are grouped according to whether a particular financial ratio was revised, in addition to the upward revision
in provision expense.
c The number in each row is the Student’s t value for the null hypothesis that the mean difference between the originally
reported and subsequently revised financial ratio is zero. * Significant at the 1-percent level. † Significant at the 5-percent
level.
- 39 -Table 10: Two-Stage Least Squares Regression Results for REVISION
(CAMELS-1 = 1 or 2)
a
EXAM REVISION

































































































































a There are 24,519 observations, 9,643 with EXAM=1 and 245 with REVISION=1.
* Significant at the 1-percent level. † Significant at the 5-percent level.
- 40 -Table 11: Two-Stage Least Squares Regression Results for REVISION
(CAMELS-1 = 3, 4, or 5)
a
EXAM REVISION

































































































































a There are 995 observations, 563 with EXAM=1 and 91 with REVISION=1.
* Significant at the 1-percent level. † Significant at the 5-percent level.
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